Abstract. The concept of asymptotic correctability of Bell-diagonal quantum states is generalised to elementary quantum systems of higher dimensions. Based on these results basic properties of quantum state purification protocols are investigated which are capable of purifying tensor products of Bell-diagonal states and which are based on B-steps of the Gottesman-Lo-type with the subsequent application of a CalderbankShor-Steane quantum code. Consequences for maximum tolerable error rates of quantum cryptographic protocols are discussed.
Introduction
Quantum state purification protocols which are based on local operations and classical communication and which are capable of purifying tensor products of Bell-diagonal quantum states are of considerable current interest in the area of quantum cryptography. This may be traced back to the fact that the security analysis and questions concerning achievable secret-key rates of many quantum cryptographic protocols are based on basic properties of such quantum-state purification protocols [1, 2] . So far, a satisfactory understanding of such protocols has already been obtained in qubit-based scenarios.
In particular, it was demonstrated that powerful quantum-state purification protocols can be developed for tensor products of Bell-diagonal states by combining a sufficiently large number of purification steps involving classical two-way communication, so called B-steps [2] , with subsequent quantum error correction based on Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [3] which involve classical one-way communication only. Furthermore, the asymptotic properties of these protocols for large numbers of B-steps can be analysed in a convenient way by characteristic exponents which govern the relation between bitand phase errors [4] . Based on such an analysis it is straightforward, for example, to determine maximally tolerable bit-error probabilities of quantum cryptographic protocols of the prepare-and-measure type whose security analysis can be reduced to the purification of Bell-diagonal qubit states [2, 4, 5, 6] . Contrary to qubit-based scenarios, elementary properties of quantum-state purification protocols are still rather unexplored in quantum cryptographic contexts in which the transfer of quantum information is based on higher-dimensional elementary quantum systems, so called qudits.
Recently, some qudit-based quantum cryptographic protocols were developed whose security analysis can be related to basic properties of quantum-state purification protocols capable of purifying tensor products of generalized Bell-diagonal quantum states [7, 8, 9] . Motivated by these current developments in this paper the asymptotic properties of qudit-based quantum-state purification protocols are investigated which involve B-steps and the subsequent application of a CSS code fulfilling the Shannon bound of Hamada [10] . For this purpose, the previously developed concept of asymptotic correctability is generalized to arbitrary-dimensional elementary quantum systems and corresponding relevant exponents are determined which govern the relation between ditand phase errors for large numbers of purification steps (compare with theorem 2). In quantum cryptographic applications the phase-error probabilities are not accessible to direct measurement, but they have to be estimated on the basis of the measured quditerror probabilities. For this purpose it is convenient to start a purification protocol with a local unitary mixing transformation which homogenises the phase errors associated with each possible dit error. The asymptotic correctability under the resulting quantumstate purification protocol can be determined in a rather straightforward way (compare with theorem 4). This latter result is particularly useful for determining lower bounds on maximally tolerable qudit-error probabilities of quantum cryptographic protocols whose security analysis can be reduced to the asymptotic correctability under these latter quantum-state purification protocols. This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 basic notions of qudit-systems, such as the definition of generalised Bell states, are summarized. Section 3 is devoted to the definition of asymptotic correctability of general quantum state purification protocols which involve tensor products of generalized Bell-diagonal qudit states. In particular, theorem 2 relates this asymptotic correctability to basic properties of exponents which govern the relation between dit and phase errors. Section 4 specializes these results to purification protocols which start with a local mixing operation followed by generalised B-steps and a subsequent application of a CSS quantum code. In Section 5 lower bounds on maximally tolerable dit-error probabilities of quantum cryptographic protocols are discussed whose postprocessing can be reduced to the analysis of such purification protocols.
Quantum systems of dimension d
We consider a quantum system of dimension d, which is called a qudit. A certain orthonormal basis of the associated Hilbert space H = C d is labelled by the elements of the set Z d := {0, . . . , d − 1}, which are representatives of the ring of residue classes Z/dZ, i. e. we consider all operations modulo d; we denote addition and subtraction by "⊕" and "⊖", respectively. We further denote Z * d := Z d \ {0}. ‡ In analogy to the abbreviation "bit" for "binary digit" we use the term "dit" for "d-ary digit".
We will need the notion of a probability distribution on d elements, which can be identified with normalised d-tuples of non-negative real numbers. For convenience, we denote the set of such tuples by
For such a probability distribution p = (p 0 , . . . , p d−1 ) ∈ W d the Shannon entropy is defined by
The Hilbert space of a pair of qudits, i. e. H ⊗ H, has a basis of maximally entangled states, which we call the (generalised) Bell basis of this system. It is defined by [11] |Ψ lm := 1
where z := exp(2πi/d) is the principal root of unity of order d. We denote the associated density matrices by (l, m) := |Ψ lm Ψ lm |. We will frequently use classical mixtures of generalised Bell states, i. e. states of the form
Such mixtures we will identify with their coefficient matrix §, so that we can write
The only condition on the entries is, that they form a probability distribution on Z d ×Z d , i. e. that all A lm are non-negative and sum up to one. The set of all such mixtures of generalised Bell states will be denoted by S
bd . We will consider |Ψ 00 as the reference state for purification, so that we can interpret l and m as phase and dit errors, respectively. The columns of the coefficient matrix thus represent different dit values, whereas the rows represent different phase values. A generalised XOR operation on two qudits, the source and the target, is defined by GXOR|k |l := |k |k ⊖ l [11] . The bilateral version applied to two pure generalised Bell states (l 1 , m 1 ) and (l 2 , m 2 ) yields
Another mathematical tool which we use is the so-called p-norm for tuples of fixed length, where
for p ∈ [1; ∞) and
Of particular interest is the fact that the 2-norm is invariant with respect to a discrete Fourier transform.
Asymptotic correctability for qudit systems
In this section we consider entanglement purification protocols and their properties. We assume that two distant parties, Alice and Bob, share a large amount of mixtures of generalised Bell states, i. e. their joint state is ρ ⊗n for ρ ∈ S
bd and some large n ∈ N. They perform two-way entanglement purification until the use of a CSS code fulfilling the quantum Shannon bound allows them to extract some pure generalised Bell state, e. g. |Ψ 00 . The quantum Shannon bound is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Quantum Shannon Bound) Let d be a prime number and consider a state ρ = (A lm ) Proof: This is an obvious consequence of a theorem by Hamada ([10] , Theorem 2).
Using this bound, we can now define the notion of asymptotic correctability; due to the use of that theorem, in the following we consider d always to be prime. For d = 2, this definition reduces to the one given in [4] .
of a quantum state purification protocol takes as input a state of the form ρ ⊗n and outputs a state of the form ρ ′ ⊗n ′ , where ρ, ρ
bd . In general, n ′ ≤ n and ρ ′ is supposed to be more entangled than ρ. Occasionally, a step may fail and does not output anything. As we do not consider distillation rates we can drop the labels n and n ′ . A correction step will thus be treated as a function on S
n ) n∈N be a sequence of possible correction steps in an entanglement purification protocol. The state ρ is called asymptotically S
We now want to generalise the criterion for asymptotic correctability of [4] to qudits. It turns out that this generalisation is straightforward and essentially is a reformulation of the previous result. The main difficulty in the proof lies in dealing with Shannon entropies for d elements instead of the binary Shannon entropy.
As in the qubit case we focus on Taylor expansions of the Shannon entropy. The following two lemmata will considerably simplify our approach.
Lemma 1 (Bounds for the Shannon entropy)
holds, and we calculate
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Proof: See Appendix B.
The following theorem now generalises Theorem 1 of [4] to higher dimensions.
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic correctability)
Let d be prime and ρ = (A lm )
bd be a state on which for each n ∈ N a (fictive) S 
The factor √ 2 next to y n is only for consistency of notation with the qubit case [4] .
(ii) If, on the other hand inf {x n /y 2 n | n ∈ N} > 0 holds, then ρ is asymptotically noncorrectable with respect to that sequence.
Both statements remain valid, if the role of dit errors and phase errors is interchanged.
Proof: We may assume that lim n→∞ y n = 0; otherwise our statement follows directly from Theorem 1. Considering the distribution of dit errors ξ = (A * m ) d−1 m=0 and using the binary Shannon entropy H(x) = −x log 2 x − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x), Lemma 1 allows us to write
where L = ln 2/ ln d and c :
is some bounded function. By Lemma 2, for the distribution of phase errors p due to (2y
we have
where
In the following, we will also use the property that lim x→0 + H(x)/x s = 0 for s ∈ [0; 1) and lim x→0 + H(x)/x s = +∞ for s ∈ [1; ∞). For the proof of statement (i), note that condition (i) now implies that x n ≤ cy r n for some c ≥ 0, which yields
This means that in (14) all terms except 2K converge to zero. For the proof of (ii), we have x n ≥ cy 2 n for some c. In a similar fashion as before, this results in
Also, the second term is negative, whereas all other terms are bounded, so that for sufficiently large n the quantum Shannon bound is not fulfilled.
Entanglement purification protocols and asymptotic correctability
In this section, we want to apply our criterion to an actual sequence of correction steps. We therefore focus on a well-known example for two-way entanglement purification, which we will call B n -correctability, whereas for r (d) ≤ 2 we have non-correctability. These results generalise our previous results from [4] from qubits to qudits.
Bell diagonal states and B (d) n steps
We now introduce a generalisation of the B n step to d dimensions. For n ∈ N, a B (d) n step is defined by the following procedure.
(i) Alice and Bob arbitrarily choose n qudit pairs QP 1 , . . . , QP n .
(ii) Alice and Bob apply n − 1 GBXOR transformations with control QP 1 and target pairs QP 2 , . . . , QP n .
(iii) Alice and Bob measure the parity on the pairs QP 2 , . . . , QP n and discard the measured pairs. They keep QP 1 , if and only if all parities are zero, otherwise they discard it.
Starting with a tensor product of Bell states, the transformation of step (ii) is given by
The first pair is thus kept, if m 1 ⊖ m k = 0 holds for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
Because we deal with mixtures of generalised Bell states, we want to formulate a B 
Asymptotic correctability using a sequence of B (d) n steps
Before we proceed with the calculation, we have to introduce some notation. As might be seen from Theorem 2, we mainly have to focus on purely exponential behaviour, that is, in many equations we will skip subexponential terms. To be precise, for some non-negative-valued function, we define its exponent by z(f ) := lim n→∞ n f (n), where we always assume that this limit exists; any such function may now be written as f (n) = c(n)z n for some subexponential function c, i. e. some function c such that z(c) = 1 holds. We call two-functions f and g asymptotically exponentially equal, if z(f ) = z(g), in which case we shall write f a.e.
= g.
For simplicity we will further assume that A * 0 > max {A * m | m ∈ Z * d } holds; if this is not the case, we can apply the local-unitary operation 1I ⊗ k∈Z d |k ⊖ m k|, provided that A * m is the unique largest column. We further assume that the phase error rates converge to the uniform probability distribution, which is always the case unless the the component of the Fourier transform of the first column which has maximum absolute value is not unique.
Evolution of dit errors
The evolution of dit errors is straightforward. We denote by ξ = (ξ 0 , . . . 
which follows directly from Theorem 3. Therefore, using the notation of Theorem 2,
Setting ξ max := max {ξ m | m ∈ Z * d }, the following inequality holds for the denominator:
Using an appropriate function h : 
The evolution of phase errors
In comparison to the dit-error evolution, the calculation of the phase errors is more sophisticated. For using Theorem 2, we only need to calculate the value 2y
where p is the phase error distribution (p l := A l * ) and g = (1/d, . . . , 1/d) is the uniform probability distribution. By use of Theorem 3, it follows
The 2-norm is invariant with respect to a discrete Fourier transform (
Thus the use of
The zero component cancels against the normalisation; this yields
where we take the 2-norm on d − 1 elements only. The evaluation in the general case is complicated, although one may expect that in the limit n → ∞ only the first column of (A lm )
l,m=0 should be relevant. In the next section we will slightly modify the protocol, so that a calculation of the exponential behaviour of 2y 2 n for the modified protocol becomes possible.
The mixing operation
Consider the single-qudit transformation
z −x 2 |x x| and define
This implies
That is, the transformation of a Bell-diagonal state by the local unitary operation U permutes the coefficients within a fixed column of the coefficient matrix. This property can be used to simplify the calculation of 2y 2 n ; we therefore introduce the following step immediately before Alice and Bob apply the B (d) n step.
• For each qudit pair Alice and Bob randomly choose a value n ∈ Z d and apply U n to the respective pair.
Considering a density matrix ρ, this means ρ → d
l,m=0 , this step mixes the entries in the columns. Complete mixing within column m, i. e. A lm → A * m /d, will take place, if 2m and the dimension d are coprime. If we want to have complete mixing for all columns except the m = 0 column, we have to restrict our considerations to odd primes (which we already did due to the use of Theorem 1); the case d = 2 (the only even prime) was done in [4] .
For fixed l ∈ Z d , one can calculate
and due to l = 0 in (22) it follows
It can now be seen, that
This shows that the determination of the evolution of phase errors is related to the search for the largest absolute value of the Fourier transform of a probability distribution, where the zero component of the transformed tuple is ignored.
Exponential behaviour
Up to now, we have shown x n a.e. 
The condition x n a.e.
= y
This generalises the characteristic exponent r from our previous work [4] from qubits to qudits. Finally, we have to relate the characteristic exponent r (d) to the conditions in Theorem 2; this we will do in the following theorem.
Proof: Setting r := r (d) and using (19) and (29) we find
The characteristic exponent r (d) is chosen in such a way that (x ·ỹ r ) n = 1 (in particular, x n /y r n a.e. = 1). The remaining terms are bounded for all n ∈ N by some lower bound being larger than zero and some upper bound being less than infinity. Thus, Theorem 2 implies the assertion.
Applications in quantum cryptography
Let us now consider some cryptographical applications of our theorems. In the generic model of entanglement-based quantum cryptography, Alice prepares the state |Ψ 00 ⊗n and sends every second qudit to Bob. The transmission is considered to be insecure, so that Eve can perform general coherent attacks. The task of Alice and Bob is now to estimate the resulting errors and, if possible, to perform entanglement purification. This provides Alice and Bob with (nearly) maximally entangled states, from which they can extract a secret key.
Although in general the total state of Alice and Bob is complicated, a random permutation of their qudit pairs and a fictive-Bell-measurement argument [2] allows us to restrict the theoretical analysis to tensor products of mixtures of generalised Bell states. If we consider protocols consisting of one B (d) n step for an appropriately chosen n ∈ N and the application of a CSS code according to Theorem 1, we only have to determine the coefficients (A lm ) d−1 l,m=0 in order to determine, whether we can obtain a secret key.
A final remark has to be made on prepare-and-measure protocols. The reduction of CSS-based protocols for qudits was done by Hamada [10] and the reduction of B (d) n steps also follows the well-known lines (cf. e. g. [2, 8] ). The only remaining point is the reduction of our mixing operation; but this mixing only mixes phases and does not change any dit value and therefore has no influence on the key. This means Alice and Bob can just skip it in the associated prepare-and-measure protocol.
In the remaining part we will consider states which may appear in a quantum cryptographic protocol, and we will also deal with the problem that in general we cannot infer all coefficients (A lm ) d−1 l,m=0 from measurements.
The generalised isotropic case
We start with a particularly simple example, namely generalised isotropic states, which were also considered in [9] . A generalised isotropic state is of the form
If β = γ, this is called an isotropic state. An interesting property of generalised isotropic states is that they remain of this form, if they are subjected to B 
, where the coefficients are given by
Evaluation of (30) now yields
and thus
Using α > β, we regain the result for isotropic channels of our previous work [9] . In the case d = 2, this state reduces to the general mixture of qubit Bell states as considered in [4] . Further note, that in the case of generalised isotropic channels we could have done the calculation for r (d) without the use of the mixing operation.
Maximum tolerable error rates for two-basis cryptography
In quantum cryptography, the protocol in [7] produces isotropic states, where β = γ = δ, but uses d + 1 mutually orthogonal bases. On the other hand, the theoretical analysis of protocols which use only two bases do not, in general, leads to generalised isotropic states.
Let us now focus on protocols which use two Fourier-dual bases and in which the the total dit value probabilities A * m (m ∈ Z d ) are measured. Such protocols were considered in [8] and it was shown there, that for l, m ∈ Z d the symmetry relations Note that in the case of the generalised isotropic channel this is an equality. Up to this point we have given a simple, but achievable lower bound on M. In order to infer this lower bound from the qudit-error probabilities measurable in the protocol we use the relations 
The isotropic channel of (32) is the worst case with respect to correctability (i. e., it has the smallest r (d) ) of all apparently isotropic channels, i. e. channels where
Furthermore, we have equality in (40) and thus in (41), if for this isotropic channel δ = 0 holds; this case was considered in [9] . If we do not have an isotropic channel, the tolerable error rate according to our bound depends on f , which can be seen as a parameter characterizing the non-isotropy of the measured probability distribution.
By plugging in our bound for M and solving for x = A * 0 , we get as a sufficient condition for correctability
where we only consider x > (d + 1)/(2d) due to the entanglement bound of [8] . In figure 1 we plotted bounds on the maximum tolerable error rate (1 − x) as a function of d. The upper line is the apparently isotropic case (f = 1), the lower one the case with just one type of error (f = d − 1). The lower bound for the maximum tolerable error rate in a given protocol lies between these two lines. We thus have shown lower bounds on the maximum tolerable error rates of two-basis quantum cryptography using the protocols considered. In case of apparently isotropic channels our bounds are exact lower bounds, in other cases they become worse the more non-isotropic the channel gets.
Conclusions
We have generalised the ideas of our previous work [4] , namely the notion of asymptotic correctability, to d-dimensional quantum systems. We determined a criterion for asymptotic correctability and applied it to B n -correctability. Applying this condition to cryptographic protocols yielded lower bounds for maximum tolerable error rates and the bound in the case of apparently isotropic channels is tight.
Up to now our proof relies on the existence of asymmetric CSS codes for d dimensions [10] . If such codes exist for non-prime dimensions (e. g. prime powers), our result can be easily generalised to these dimensions, provided the mixing operation is adapted accordingly. It would also be interesting to explicitly calculate the value M = max
are known for all l ∈ Z d and to infer better bounds on M for the non-isotropic case by using the symmetry relations of two-bases protocols, but both tasks seem to be relatively complicated.
Due to the fact that we only consider probability distributions p, the first order term vanishes and the second order term can be written in the form of Lemma 2 using K := d/(2 ln d). The remainder term R 2 (p) can be calculated by Lagrange's formula, i. e. 
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we give the proof of Theorem 3, which closely follows the ideas presented in [12] . The main idea in the proof is that the phase propagation can be seen as a convolution, which can be calculated by a sequence of Fourier transform, multiplication and inverse Fourier transform. The proof is done by induction, which (the case n = 1 being obvious) we start for n = 2. Consider (A lm ) lm , (B st ) st ∈ S where N 2 = m [( l A lm )( l B lm )] is the normalisation constant. We assume now that the theorem is true for all numbers upto a fixed value n and proceed via induction: Let ρ (i) = (A 
